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Note
Solving the Problem of Problem-Solving Justice:
Rebalancing Federal Court Investment in
Reentry and Pretrial Diversion Programs
By Devin T. Driscoll∗
Rosemary has just been arrested near the campus of the
University of Oregon, in Eugene.1 Eugene Police Department officers, while conducting a routine traffic stop, discovered twentyseven grams of powder cocaine on her person. Rosemary, a sophomore at the University, has never been arrested before. While
this volume of cocaine is not enough to bump her into mandatory
minimum territory, 2 which would require a judge to impose a
particular sentence, federal prosecution still carries a possible

∗ J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2008,
Providence College; M.P.P. 2011, University of Minnesota Hubert H. Humphrey
School of Public Affairs. This Note would not exist without several incredible
members of the federal and state bench: thank you to Judge Ann Aiken for inspiring me to learn more about criminal reentry through her innovation and
service to the people of Oregon; to Judge Jack B. Weinstein for providing me
with invaluable information about the antirecidivism work of the Eastern District of New York; to Judges Donovan Frank and Susan Richard Nelson for allowing me to observe their reentry court programs in the District of Minnesota;
and to Judge Mark J. Kappelhoff for his encouragement and counsel during my
early development of this project. Thank you to the talented editors and staff of
Minnesota Law Review for your tireless efforts as Guardians of the Profession,
and also for your friendship. I am particularly grateful to Frank Guenthner,
Taylor Mayhall, Caitlin Opperman, Emily Atmore, and Mitchell Ness for their
assistance in making this Note worthy of inclusion in Volume 102. Finally,
thank you to Katie Driscoll for your unwavering support, your wisdom, and your
compassion. I love you. Copyright © 2018 by Devin T. Driscoll.
1. This fictionalized account offers a perspective of the critical impact
prosecution under the state-based ex-ante approach can have, versus prosecution under the federal ex-post approach.
2. See, e.g., Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Federal Mandatory
Minimums, FAMM.ORG, http://www.famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
Chart-All-Fed-MMs-NW.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2018) (listing five kilograms
of cocaine as the amount necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum prison
sentence under federal law).
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sentence of up to twenty years in prison. 3 If, however, Rosemary
is charged by the Lane County District Attorney for the Class C
felony of unlawful possession of cocaine, 4 she could face up to five
years of incarceration.5 This disparity in sentences is not the
only significant difference in potential outcome based on
whether she is charged by federal or state authorities. Rosemary, if charged by Oregon, would be eligible for the state’s drug
court—a specialized docket “designed to rapidly place drug-affected defendants into appropriate treatment programs with
close supervision by a single judge familiar with both treatment
and the offenders.” 6 The state charges against Rosemary would
be dropped if she completes the drug court program. No similar
preconviction diversionary program exists in the federal system.
After her release from prison, however, Rosemary could be eligible for the federal program based on drug courts: the District of
Oregon’s reentry court.
This Note explores the creation of so-called problem-solving
courts, including state drug courts and federal reentry courts, as
well as the future of this kind of reform within the federal criminal justice system. Part I traces the development of problemsolving courts, beginning first with state drug courts in the
1990s, then state-based reentry courts in the early 2000s, before
reviewing reforms to the federal system in the same period and
the creation of federal reentry courts in the late 2000s. This Part
offers—for the first time anywhere—a synthesis of the development of both state and federal programs designed to address addiction-related recidivism, 7 and classifies these two major categories of intervention as either ex ante or ex post. Part II
considers challenges attendant to placing an ex-ante policy intervention—drug courts—in the ex-post policy context of criminal reentry. Part III offers a solution, both for (1) the creation of
federal drug courts, either under existing statutory authority or
3. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL30722, DRUG OFFENSES:
MAXIMUM FINES AND TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT FOR VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND RELATED LAWS 5 (2015).
4. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.884 (2017).
5. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.605 (2017).
6. What Is a Drug Court, LANE CTY. CIRCUIT COURT, http://www.courts
.oregon.gov/Lane/DrugCourt/pages/drugcourtpage.aspx#dcwhat (last visited
Jan. 30, 2018).
7. Recidivism is defined generally as “[t]he action of relapsing into crime,
or reoffending, esp. habitually; the tendency to behave in this way.” Recidivism,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/159514?
redirectedFrom=recidivism. For a more technical definition of the term in the
problem-solving court context, see infra note 40.
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the inherent power of courts to create necessary procedural tools
to manage their dockets; and (2) for the further development of
federal reentry courts, via (a) institutionalization of the program
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; and (b) investment in further research and development.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL PROBLEMSOLVING COURTS
Beginning in the late 1980s, largely as a response to the
crack and methamphetamine epidemics, 8 states revolutionized
their pre- and post-conviction adjudication models for drug offenders. The first innovation is what this Note will call “the exante response”: drug courts, which were designed (1) as a substitute for traditional adjudicatory proceedings failing to treat the
underlying issue of offender addiction; and (2) to intervene before
criminal conviction. 9 Through a program of “early, continuous,
and intense judicially supervised treatment,” these programs offered substance-dependent defendants an alternative to incarceration.10 The apparent success of drug courts paved the way
for a host of other specialty courts: juvenile drug courts, DUI
courts, veterans courts, domestic violence courts, and mental
health courts.11 These specialty courts have been generally labeled problem-solving courts.12 According to the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP), there are now

8. See, e.g., Noel Murray, “Snowfall”: Everything You Need to Know About
FX’s Origins-of-Crack Drama, ROLLING STONE (June 30, 2017), http://www
.rollingstone.com/tv/news/snowfall-what-you-need-to-know-about-fxs-crack-epidemic-drama-w488146 (describing the new television program tracing the history of the crack cocaine epidemic in 1980s Los Angeles); The Crack Epidemic,
U.S. DEA, https://web.archive.org/web/20060823024931/http://www.usdoj.gov/
dea/pubs/history/1985-1990.html.
9. The National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) defines
“adult drug court” as a “specially designed court calendar or docket, . . . [designed] to achieve a reduction in recidivism and substance abuse among . . . offenders and to increase the offender ’s likelihood of successful habilitation.”
Types of Drug Courts, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, http://www.nadcp
.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/models (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Mitchell B. Mackinem & Paul Higgins, Introduction to PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, at vii (Paul
Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009).
12. Id. (“Problem-solving courts are local courts that seek to remedy detrimental community conditions through sustained attention and through possible
therapeutic interventions with individual offenders who experience debilitating
personal conditions.”).
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more than 1200 non-drug-court problem-solving courts operating in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 13
The next innovation this Note will refer to as “the ex-post
response”: reentry courts, which were designed to reduce recidivism after an offender is released from prison as part of a criminal conviction for drug crimes.14 Following a generation of experimentation at the state level, Article III judges began to modify
and adapt the reentry model for application to federal courts.15
To understand the development of federal reentry courts,
one must first understand the development of their state court
analogues. Section A reviews the history of state drug courts and
their efforts to combat addiction-based recidivism. Section B discusses the genesis of post-incarceration reentry courts at the
state level. Section C examines the application of these models
to federal courts.
A. HISTORY OF STATE DRUG COURTS
The first drug court in the United States was established by
Dade County, Florida 16 in 1989.17 A response to the crack-cocaine epidemic,18 it operated as an alternative to incarceration. 19
Participants had moderate-to-severe substance abuse issues and
13. Problem Solving Courts, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, http://www
.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/types-drug-courts/problem-solving
-courts (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
14. The NADCP defines “reentry drug court” as one which “utilize[s] the
drug court model . . . to facilitate the reintegration of drug-involved offenders
into communities upon their release from local or state correctional facilities.”
NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, supra note 9.
15. The National Drug Court Institute defines federal reentry courts as
“post-incarceration, cooperative effort[s] of the U.S. District Courts, U.S. Probation Office, Federal Public Defender and U.S. Attorney’s Office . . . providing a
blend of treatment and sanction alternatives to address re-integration into the
community for nonviolent, substance-abusing offenders released from federal
prison.” WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG COURT
INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS
AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 44
(2011).
16. The name of the county was changed to Miami-Dade in 1997.
17. Greg Berman, Problem-Solving Justice and the Moment of Truth, in
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, supra
note 11, at 1, 4; see also JEFFREY TAUBER & KATHLEEN R. SNAVELY, NAT’L DRUG
COURT INST., DRUG COURTS: A RESEARCH AGENDA 1 (Apr. 1999).
18. DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE ET AL., NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE
CURRENT PICTURE: NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEMSOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 13 fig.1 (2016) [hereinafter
NDCI REPORT].
19. Id. at 11.

2018]

FEDERAL PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE

1385

were charged with a drug-related offense.20 “[C]areer criminals
[or] violent offenders,” however, were not allowed into the program. 21 Participants were required to complete a treatment program, refrain from drug or alcohol use for a significant period of
time (enforced through frequent random urinalysis tests), remain arrest free, follow supervision conditions, and pursue education or employment.22
The Dade County drug court differed from a typical adversarial proceeding. Instead of acting as a disinterested neutral,
the judge was “the leader of a multidisciplinary team of professionals” composed of the prosecutor, defense attorney, probation
officer, and representatives from treatment and service organizations. 23 As one prosecutor who participated in the program
noted, “In this court all of us are public defenders, really.” 24 The
team met before each bimonthly or monthly session to confer
about participant progress, and to recommend either rewards or
consequences to be handed down by the judge during the session. 25 These “incentives and sanctions [we]re moderate in magnitude and delivered with certainty.” 26 Once a participant successfully completed the program, they were diverted out of the
criminal justice system without a conviction on their record 27—
avoiding both the high costs of incarceration 28 and the collateral
consequences that follow conviction. 29 These twin benefits to
20. Id.
21. Ronald Smothers, Miami Tries Treatment, Not Jail, in Drug Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at A10.
22. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 11.
23. Id.
24. Smothers, supra note 21.
25. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 11.
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 11 (noting the varying methods of post-completion impacts on
criminal records).
28. See Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 80 Fed.
Reg. 12523 (Mar. 09, 2015) (finding the “average cost of incarceration for Federal inmates in Fiscal Year 2014 was $30,619.85 ($83.89 per day)”); see also
Marc Santora, City’s Annual Cost Per Inmate Is $168,000, Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2013, at A16 (noting the “annual average taxpayer cost in [forty
participating] states was $31,286 per inmate”).
29. See, e.g., MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 2.1 (2016)
(listing specific categories of collateral consequences). “Persons convicted of
crimes are subject to a wide variety of sanctions and restrictions in addition to
the sentence imposed by the court. These so-called ‘collateral consequences’ of
conviction are frequently more punitive and long-lasting than court-imposed
sanctions like a prison term or fine.” Id. at § 1.2.
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both offender and society have been a selling point of drug courts
since their inception in Miami, 30 and are a hallmark of the exante approach to combating addiction-related recidivism.
This model was based largely on a recognition that “traditional threats of punishment and probation do not deter drug use
by the majority of individuals struggling with addiction.” 31 Drug
courts “obtain [their] results by integrating treatment, close supervision, frequent drug testing, sanctions for court violations,
and incentives for compliant behavior.” 32 Then-Dade County
State Attorney Janet Reno was instrumental in creating the first
drug court,33 and, after becoming Attorney General of the United
States in 1993, 34 she instituted a series of grants to incentivize
state and local governments to replicate the model around the
country. 35 After Reno’s first year at the Department of Justice,

30. See Smothers, supra note 21 (noting that the “program costs about $1.2
million [which] translated into about $500 to $700 a person a year, roughly the
cost of jailing an offender for nine days”).
31. Caitlinrose Fisher, Treating the Disease or Punishing the Criminal?: Effectively Using Drug Court Sanctions to Treat Substance Use Disorder and Decrease Criminal Conduct, 99 MINN. L. REV. 747, 747–48 (2014); see also Richard
L. Wiener & Leah Georges, Social Psychology and Problem-Solving Courts: Judicial Roles and Decision Making, in PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (Richard L. Wiener & Eve M. Brank eds.,
2013) (noting that “traditional tools of the criminal justice system . . . [such as]
deterrence [and] incapacitation . . . are ill suited to address the personal and
psychological failings of lawbreakers who suffer from underlying social and psychological dysfunction[s]” such as addiction).
32. Fisher, supra note 31, at 748 (citation omitted).
33. See Smothers, supra note 21 (noting that according to participating
judges, the program “could not [have] operate[d]” without Reno’s support).
34. Reno’s nomination may have been due, at least in part, to the Dade
County Drug Court. At the Rose Garden press conference where he announced
Reno as his nominee to lead the Justice Department, President Clinton listed
among his reasons for selecting her, “[s]he launched a drug court program that
has become nationally acclaimed that gets young first-time offenders back on
track.” Attorney General Nomination, C-SPAN, https://www.c-span.org/video/
?37897-1/attorney-general-nomination (Feb. 11, 1993). He then added, “[I]f I
might be permitted a little personal moment, I’ve had a high regard for Janet
Reno for some time because my brother-in-law [Hugh Rodham] is the defense
attorney in the drug court . . . so I’ve known about her exploits for some time.”
Id.
35. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, Drug Court Seeks End to Revolving-Door Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at B3 (“ The court is modeled after the first such
court, started in Miami in 1990 with the help of Janet Reno, then the prosecutor
in drug-plagued Dade County, Fla. As United States Attorney General, Ms.
Reno is now championing the creation of drug courts around the country. She
presented grants for nine new courts on May 9.”); Mireya Navarro, Experimental Courts Are Using New Strategies to Blunt the Lure of Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
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there were nineteen drug courts in the United States. 36 At the
end of her tenure,37 in 2000, there were 665. 38 Today, there are
more than 3000 drug courts, located in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia.39
While federal funding and support were key to the rapid
adoption of drug courts by the states, so too was their strong
track record of success; studies found that the average drug court
reduced recidivism by eight to fourteen percent, 40 and the bestperforming drug courts reduced recidivism by between thirtyfive to eighty percent. 41 Additionally, studies found the programs
to be “highly cost-effective . . . produc[ing] an average return on
investment of approximately $2 to $4 for every $1 invested.” 42
Even researchers critical of problem-solving courts acknowledge
they “generat[e] actual and potential cost savings and substantially reduc[e] drug use and recidivism while offenders are in the
program . . . and to a lesser but still significant extent . . . after
they leave the program.” 43

Oct. 17, 1996, at A25 (“Attorney General Janet Reno, who was the chief prosecutor in Dade County when the first drug court was established in Miami in
1989, has pushed to expand the program nationwide and doubled spending on
it this year, to $30 million.”).
36. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 34 tbl.3.
37. Reno served as Attorney General of the United States from March 11,
1993 to January 20, 2001, the second-longest term in the history of the republic.
See Jane Onyanga-Omara & Kevin Johnson, Janet Reno, First Female U.S. Attorney General, Dies at 78, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.usatoday
.com/story/news/nation/2016/11/07/reports-janet-reno-first-female-us-attorney
-general-dies/93412386.
38. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 34 tbl.3.
39. Id. The NDCI Report indicates there were 3057 drug courts as of December 31, 2014. Id. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) website has an updated figure of 3142 as of June, 2015. Drug Courts, NAT’L INSTITUTE JUST.,
https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-courts/Pages/welcome.aspx (last updated Jan. 10, 2017).
40. NDCI REPORT, supra note 18, at 15 (citation omitted). Recidivism is defined as “rearrest rates over at least two years.” Id. (citation omitted).
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. Id. (citation omitted). Wide adoption of problem-solving courts “may
also reflect a broader [societal] transition from punitive and retributive punishment to therapeutic and restorative justice.” Fisher, supra note 31, at 755 (citation omitted). For a seminal discussion of the concept of therapeutic justice, see
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1972).
43. Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, I DRUG
CT. REV. 10, 29 (1998).
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE REENTRY COURTS
1. Growth of Prison Population
Despite the demonstrated impact of problem-solving courts,
participation was limited to a narrow subset of offenders: those
with eligible charges like “nonviolent drug offenses, theft, or
other crimes stemming from the participant’s underlying addiction.” 44 Such programs, in particular, did not reach already incarcerated persons—whose numbers were rapidly growing. The
number of adults incarcerated at the state and local level grew
seventy-eight percent—from 1,048,800 to 1,834,300—in the decade following the 1989 founding of the Dade County drug court. 45
Over that same period of time, there was a significant shift from
indeterminate to determinate sentencing at both the state and
federal levels. 46 Under an indeterminate model, judges hand
down sentences with a range of time to serve, such as ten to
twenty-five years. 47 The lower end of the range was believed to
be the minimum sentence necessary to serve as a punitive response to the crime; the remainder could be served on parole, so
long as the offender demonstrated to a parole board that he or
she was sufficiently rehabilitated. 48 With the advent of determinate sentencing, states created commissions to set guidelines designed to limit judicial discretion in sentencing and ensure offenders served the full term of their sentence.49 The degree to
which determinate sentencing led to increased incarceration
rates in the states is contested, with data showing those states
44. Fisher, supra note 31, at 754 n.32 (citation omitted); see also supra note
21 and accompanying text.
45. See Total Adult Correctional Population, 1980–2015, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=487# (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
46. See Beth Schwartzapfel, The Power and Politics of Our Parole Boards,
WASH. POST, July 12, 2015, at A1 (noting that “[f ]ourteen states and the federal
government eliminated or severely restricted parole” and turned to determinate
sentencing schemes).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE
AND PRISONER REENTRY 12–13 (2003). In 1977, discretionary release, which had
to be “earned” by offenders, accounted for eighty-eight percent of state prison
releases. Id. In 2000, it had fallen to twenty-four percent, with mandatory released increasing to forty-one percent. Id. at 13. Minnesota became the first
state to create such a system in 1978, with its guidelines coming into operation
in 1981. About MSCG, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N., https://mn
.gov/sentencing-guidelines/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
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using sentencing guidelines “experienced below-average increments of prison growth, compared to a national baseline, in the
time period following their implementation of guidelines.” 50 At
the same time, states also adopted “mandatory minimums and
‘three strikes’ laws . . . ratchet[ing] up criminal sentences [and]
result[ing] in dramatically longer terms of imprisonment than
had previously been the norm.”51 The total state prison population peaked at 1,407,400 in 2009; 52 the federal prison population
peaked at 217,800 in 2012. 53 As of 2015, there were 1,526,800
incarcerated persons at the state and federal level. 54
2. Growth of reentry population

While the causes of mass incarceration phenomenon are
widely debated today, 55 one critical facet of this phenomenon involves the growing number of previously incarcerated persons
returning to their communities. This reintegration of offenders
is called prisoner reentry. 56 Reentry is a reality for ninety-three
percent of all incarcerated persons. 57 Combined state and federal
annual prisoner releases first crossed the half-million mark in
1997, and peaked at 734,144 in 2008.58 There were 580,871 state
offenders and 60,156 federal offenders released in 2015. 59
For reentering persons, the period after release is fraught
with temptation and danger. A 2005 Department of Justice
50. Kevin R. Reitz, Don’t Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth
Has Been Driven by Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1799 (2006).
51. Kelsey McCowan Heilman, Why Vague Sentencing Guidelines Violate
the Due Process Clause, 95 OR. L. REV. 53, 63 n.58 (citing Peter W. Low, Marvin
E. Frankel’s Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, 87 HARV. L. REV. 687
(1974) (book review) (predicting the result)).
52. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 45.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. For an excellent discussion of the racial and socioeconomic implications
of mass incarceration, see generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
56. PETERSILIA, supra note 49, at 3 (defining prisoner reentry as “all activities and programming conducted to prepare ex-convicts to return safely to the
community and to live as law-abiding citizens”).
57. Id. Prisoners with life or capital sentences—and those who unexpectedly die while incarcerated—are the only offenders who would not need to eventually reenter society. Id.
58. E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES 1991–2012, at
4 tbl.2 (2014).
59. E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2015, at 11 tbl.7 (2016).
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(DOJ) study of prisoners released in thirty states found that (a)
more than a quarter were rearrested within six months of release; (b) two-thirds were rearrested within three years; and (c)
three-quarters were rearrested within five years. 60 The twothirds rearrest rate has been documented for nearly a half-century, having first appeared in 1969, 61 and appearing in two DOJ
cohort studies (similar to the one mentioned above) undertaken
in 1983 and 1994.62 Of those rearrested within five years of release, fifty-seven percent are arrested within the first year. 63
Given these remarkably stable statistics, it appears there is a
strong need for interventions designed to keep reentering offenders from reoffending, and that “the most intensive services and
surveillance should begin immediately upon release and be
front-loaded in the first . . . year.” 64
What form that intervention should take was under debate
in the waning years of Reno’s tenure as Attorney General. In the
spring of 2000, Jeremey Travis was finishing his six years as director of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) at DOJ. 65 As he
prepared to leave, he wrote what he called a “provocative proposal” regarding reentry. 66 He suggested the reentry process
“should begin at sentencing and continue throughout the period
of release,” 67 and noted that the “traditional function of parole
boards—deciding release dates for prisoners—has been severely
diminished, if not eliminated” by the move to determinate sentencing regimes.68 Travis wondered, in the absence of parole
board oversight, what institution could best serve as the “manager” of the reentry process. 69 After considering probation/parole
supervision agencies and correctional institutions and finding
both insufficient, 70 he turned to the example of problem-solving
courts. 71 He admired very much their “finely calibrated use of
60. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN
30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, at 8 tbl.8 (2014).
61. PETERSILIA, supra note 49, at 141.
62. Id. at 141–42.
63. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 60, at 7.
64. PETERSILIA, supra note 49, at 153.
65. Jeremy Travis, JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
www.jjay.cuny.edu/faculty/jeremy-travis (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
66. Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry,
7 SENT’G & CORRECTIONS, May 2000, at 1, 8.
67. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 4.
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the scarce resources of judicial authority and prison capacity to
achieve demonstrable changes in behavior.” 72 Travis argued that
a system (1) where the “success and failure at meeting the conditions of post conviction release are . . . carefully monitored by
a figure having the moral authority of a drug court judge;” (2)
with “clearly delineated consequences for failure;” and (3) which
made “sparing use of prison,” could achieve results similar to
those of drug courts. 73
Travis ultimately suggested such a system, and gave it a
name: reentry court. 74 In his model, Travis envisioned that the
sentencing judge would preside over the whole reentry process,
since “creating a supervisory role for judges . . . gives them far
greater capacity to achieve the purposes of sentencing.” 75 A “significant purpose of [one’s] activities behind bars would be preparation for reentry” and offenders would begin treatment and
training programs linked to those they would undertake after
release.76 Similarly to those in drug court programs, participants
would, once back in their community, have to meet a series of
conditions pertaining to treatment, employment, and reintegration into society. 77 If they failed to meet those obligations, they
would be punished “in amounts proportionate to [their] failure.” 78 If they achieved their goals, the judge could “accelerate
the completion of [their] sentence,” “return privileges that might
be lost,” and “welcome [them] back to the community.” 79 Travis,
in sum, envisioned applying the ex-ante drug court model to the
ex-post context of reentry—and extending the sentencing judge’s
responsibility to the life of that process.
Attorney General Reno was strongly supportive of Travis’s
proposal, and in 2000 she directed the Office of Justice Programs
(OJP) to create a series of reentry-related programs, including
the Reentry Court Initiative (RCI). 80 As part of RCI, OJP “selected and provided technical support to nine states to implement pilot reentry courts.” 81 The pilot courts were located in:
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id. at 8.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Id.
80. Stephen E. Vance, Federal Reentry Court Programs: A Summary of Recent Evaluations, 75 FED. PROB. 64, 65 (2011).
81. Id.
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California (San Francisco)
Colorado (El Paso County)
Delaware (two distinct programs: New Castle County and
Sussex County)
Florida (Broward County)
Iowa (Cedar Rapids)
Kentucky (two distinct programs: Fayette County and
Campbell and Kenton counties)
New York (the Harlem area)
Ohio (Richland County)
West Virginia (Mineral, Tucker, and Grant counties)82
A 2003 evaluation of the pilot courts found that “it is essential [for reentry courts] to agree on the target population” eligible
to participate, since, “unlike drug courts, . . . ‘reentry courts that
target the general population of returning offenders have to meet
a diverse set of needs extending far beyond substance abuse
treatment.’” 83
Subsequent evaluations of state reentry courts 84 have found
that successful programs require even greater flexibility than exists in the drug court context, with judges needing “a higher level
of tolerance for technical violations, such as ‘dirty [drug] tests’”
in order to “dole out [the] graduated punishments” necessary to
“get the offender back on track and improve the odds of successful graduation.” 85 A recent evaluation of the Harlem court, created under the Reno-era RCI program, found participants were
less likely to be rearrested, and less likely to be reconvicted,
82. CHRISTINE LINDQUIST ET AL., REENTRY COURTS PROCESS EVALUATION
(PHASE 1), FINAL REPORT 5 (2003).
83. Vance, supra note 80, at 65 (quoting LINDQUIST ET AL., supra note 82,
at 52–53).
84. Hawaii, in 2004, became the first state to implement a state-wide probation reform initiative, called Project HOPE (Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation
with Enforcement). While not a reentry court, its procedures are designed to
achieve the same ends, with the state’s entire probation population as the target
population. Fisher, supra note 31, at 758–59 (citing HOPE Probation,
HAW. STATE JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/special_projects/hope/
about_hope_probation (last visited Jan. 30, 2018)); see also Steven S. Alm, A
New Continuum for Court Supervision, 91 OR. L. REV. 1181, 1184 (2013). Several states, including those with reentry courts, have adopted the HOPE probation model. See, e.g., H.B. 1052, 2016 Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (establishing the
Swift and Certain Probation Pilot Program); Paul Suarez, New Approach to Probation, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), May 23, 2012, at A1.
85. Rodney Villazor, Reentry Courts: An Examination of the “Provocative
Proposal” in Practice, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 253, 254 n.35 (2016) (quoting ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, REENTRY COURTS: LOOKING AHEAD
9 (2011)).
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though they were more likely to have their parole revoked. 86 Researchers were unsure what to make of the data indicating increased levels of revocation, but suspect that the intensified supervision of reentry court could be responsible.87
Support for reentry programs, including reentry courts, has
been strongly bipartisan. President George W. Bush signed the
Second Chance Act of 2007 into law on April 9, 2008. 88 The law
“reauthorize[d] and expand[ed] state and local re-entry demonstration projects that provide family reunification, job training,
education, housing, substance abuse treatment and mental
health services to adult and juvenile offenders and their families.” 89 It also created the National Reentry Resource Center,
which “provides education, training, and technical assistance to
states, tribes, territories, local governments, service providers,
non-profit organizations, and corrections institutions working on
prisoner reentry.” 90 In 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder “established a Cabinet-level federal interagency Reentry Council,
representing a significant executive branch commitment to coordinating re-entry efforts and advancing effective re-entry policies.” 91
President Obama officially chartered the Federal Interagency Reentry Council in April of 2016.92 Today, there are forty86. WOLF, supra note 85, at 4.
87. Id.
88. Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008).
89. Rhonda McMillion, Getting Out—and Staying Out, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2007,
at 64, 64; see also Michael M. O’Hear, The Second Chance Act and the Future of
Reentry Reform, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 75, 75 (2007) (predicting that “Passage of
the [Second Chance Act will] galvanize an emerging reentry reform movement
and highlight the increasing importance of reentry in the national dialogue on
crime and punishment”); Erik Eckholm, U.S. Shifting Prison Focus to Re-Entry
into Society, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, at A23; Editorial, A Second Chance, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2008, at A22 (calling on Congress to appropriate $330 million
to fully fund the Second Chance Act). But see Editorial, The Second Chance Act
Proves Its Worth, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2014, at A20 (noting that while the Act
is proving successful, Congress appropriated only $67.7 million in fiscal year
2014 to support its programs).
90. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ABOUT THE NATIONAL REENTRY RESOURCE CENTER, https://www.bja.gov/publications/
nationalreentryresourcecenter.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
91. The Attorney General’s Reentry Council, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, https://www.nij.gov/journals/270/pages/criminal-records-council
.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
92. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 833 (2017); see also Press Release, Office of the
Press Sec’y, Presidential Memorandum—Promoting Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Formerly Incarcerated Individuals (Apr. 29, 2016), https://
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three state reentry courts. 93 While they represent only a fraction
of the more than 1200 state problem-solving courts operating today,94 they represent a critical development in the experiment
begun in Miami almost three decades ago: they apply the ex-ante
approach of drug courts to the ex-post context of reentry.
C. PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
During the period where states responded to rising drug
crime by both passing harsher laws 95 and creating innovative
programs like the Dade County drug court, the federal government pursued an exclusively “tough-on-crime” approach. This led
the federal and state justice systems to become increasingly divergent in their approaches to drug crime. President Reagan
first sought and won passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 96—described by then-Associate Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen “the most significant change in the Federal system of criminal law” 97—which (1) abolished parole for
federal crimes; (2) established the U.S. Sentencing Commission
(USSC) to promulgate determinate sentencing guidelines; (3) allowed for preventative detention of persons accused of crimes; (4)
narrowed the federal insanity defense; and (5) increased civil forfeiture powers of federal law enforcement in drug cases.98 According to then-Attorney General William French Smith, the law
was designed to “restore the proper balance between the forces
of law and the forces of lawlessness.” 99 President Reagan later
signed both the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 100 and the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1988.101 These laws significantly increased,
through the use of mandatory minimum sentences, the penalties
for drug crimes—especially crack-cocaine, which had been the
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/29/presidential
-memorandum-promoting-rehabilitation-and-reintegration (last visited Jan.
30, 2018).
93. See Find a Drug Court, NAT’L DRUG COURT RES. CTR., http://www.ndcrc
.org/map (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
94. NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, supra note 9 (“As of June 30, 2012,
there were 1,122 problem-solving courts in the U.S.”).
95. See Heilman, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
96. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
97. Leslie Maitland Werner, Getting Out the Word on the New Crime Act,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1984, at A24.
98. Loretta Tofani, The Harder Line on Federal Crime, WASH. POST, Dec.
28, 1984, at A1.
99. Werner, supra note 97.
100. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
101. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
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genesis of the first problem-solving courts.102 The results were
explosive, and “ushered in a period of remarkable prison growth
in the federal system.” 103 The federal prison population grew
143% from 1980 to 1989,104 and 267% from 1980 to 1993. 105 State
and local prison populations increased 114% and 174% over the
same periods. 106
As part of the legislation creating the federal determinative
sentencing scheme and the USSC, Congress abolished parole in
the federal system and established in its place supervised release, “a ‘unique’ type of post-confinement monitoring . . . overseen by federal district courts with the assistance of federal probation officers.”107 With the abolition of federal parole, “Congress
intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition [back] to community life . . . fulfill[ing] rehabilitative ends,
distinct from those served by incarceration.” 108
A term of supervised release may be imposed at the time of
an offender’s sentencing, though only a few crimes require imposition of supervised release.109 If not mandated by the statute
under which the offender was convicted, the sentencing judge
has broad discretion in setting the term and conditions of supervised release. 110 While sentencing judges are not generally required to impose a term of supervised release, they do in an estimated ninety-five 111 to ninety-nine 112 percent of federal
102. Tracy Thompson, Cracking Down, Reluctantly, On Low-Level Drug Offenders, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1989, at A1.
103. Reitz, supra note 50, at 1799.
104. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 45.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED RELEASE 1 (2010) [hereinafter USSC REPORT].
108. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2012) (noting supervised release is required for
those convicted of “domestic violence crime[s]” and others “required by statute”).
110. Id. § 3583(d). The only limits are that any condition must “comport with
the purposes of sentencing; involve ‘no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’” to accomplish those purposes, and be consistent with USSC
policy. See Lisa A. Rich, A Federal Certificate of Rehabilitation Program: Providing Federal Ex-Offenders More Opportunity for Successful Reentry, 7 ALA. C.R.
& C.L. L. REV. 249, 279 (2016).
111. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of
Federal Supervised Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 182 (2013) (“Between
2005 and 2009, more than 95 percent of people in the federal system . . . [were]
sentenced to a term of supervised release.”).
112. Villazor, supra note 85, at 254 (noting 99.1 percent of nonmandated offenders still received a term of supervised release at sentencing).
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sentencings. From 2005 to 2009, the average supervised release
term was forty-one months. 113 The supervising judge may, after
one year, terminate a term of supervised release. 114 However, in
recent years, only twelve percent of offenders on supervised release received early termination. 115 On average, two-thirds of offenders successfully complete their term of supervised release, 116
and one-third have their supervised release status revoked “as a
result of commission of new offenses or other violations of the[ir]
conditions.” 117
Over the years that followed, the divergence of state and federal responses to drug crime was becoming clear, but Congress
failed to act and address the disparity. On October 12, 2000, Senator Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) introduced the Drug Court Act of
2000.118 The bill authorized DOJ to establish federal drug courts
in ten high-crime districts 119 by partnering with local state-run
drug court programs.120 The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, but never received a hearing or vote. Similar
legislation does not appear to have been introduced in the years
following. In November of 2004, Judge Donald P. Lay121 of the
Eighth Circuit published an op-ed in the New York Times titled
“Rehab Justice.” 122 He argued that “[m]andatory minimum sentences, enacted by Congress, have contributed to the rising costs
of imprisonment and crowding in federal prisons,” noted that
“[u]nlike the states, the federal criminal justice system offers no
alternatives for nonviolent offenders charged with drug-related
crimes,” and called on Congress to “pass[] legislation to carry out
a program for federal drug courts.” 123 The financial and human
113. USSC REPORT, supra note 107, at 55 tbl.1.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).
115. USSC REPORT, supra note 107, at 62.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 63.
118. S. 3191, 106th Cong. (2000).
119. Id. § 3(a).
120. Id. § 3(b).
121. Judge Lay was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit by President Johnson in 1966. He served as chief judge from
1979–1992. He assumed senior status in 1992, and passed away in 2007. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/
history/judges/lay-donald-pomery (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
122. Donald P. Lay, Opinion, Rehab Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at
A31.
123. Id. But see U.S. PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE
DIST. OF E.N.Y, ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK 7–11, 35–47 (2015) [hereinafter EDNY ALTERNATIVES REPORT]
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cost of the current regime, Judge Lay argued, was too great. 124
No action was taken in response to his suggestion.
While Congress failed to specifically authorize the creation
of something resembling state drug courts, 125 it had given judges
broad authority to structure the terms and conditions of federal
supervised release.126 Federal judges took advantage of this authority to create federal reentry courts. The first, called the Supervision Treatment and Re-entry (STAR) Program, was created
in 2002 by Judge Charles Sifton of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (EDNY). 127 The
STAR program targets “persons with drug or alcohol problems”
in order to provide “more assistance, stricter accountability[,]
and greater rewards for completing their supervision successfully.” 128 Other pioneering federal reentry courts include the District of Oregon (2005), the Western District of Michigan (2005),
the District of Massachusetts (2006), the Southern District of
Mississippi (2006), the Southern District of Indiana (2007), the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (2007), the Eastern District of
Utah (2008) and the Eastern District of Missouri (2008). 129
These courts are “designed to reward good behavior that is incompatible with drug use and crime,” using graduated sanctions
(describing sixteen “drug court” programs in various federal districts). These
federal “alternative to incarceration” (ATI) programs, unlike most state drug
courts, still result in conviction and sentencing of participating offenders. Id. at
11.
124. Lay, supra note 122.
125. Id. Contra CHARLES P. SIFTON & JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REPORT ON A PROPOSED INTENSIVE POST-SENTENCE DRUG SUPERVISION PROGRAM FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 11 (2006) (on file with author) (arguing that United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and “the inherent power of . . . district
court judges to fashion appropriate sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3553” provide
sufficient legal authority for federal judges to impose state drug court-like deferred or alternative sentences). See also EDNY ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra
note 123, at 63 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3154 as legal authority for the EDNY Pretrial
Opportunity Program, a pre-sentencing diversionary program based on state
drug courts). This author is indebted to Judge Weinstein for his assistance in
locating copies of these reports, and for additional materials on EDNY program
innovation.
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
127. See SIFTON & WEINSTEIN, supra note 125, at 1; see also DANIEL W.
CLOSE ET AL., THE DISTRICT OF OREGON REENTRY COURT: EVALUATION, POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND REPLICATION STRATEGIES 1 (2008); Andrew S. Harris,
The STAR Program in the Eastern District of New York, FED. B. COUNCIL Q.
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.federalbarcouncilquarterly.org/?p=315; EDNY ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 123, at 48.
128. SIFTON & WEINSTEIN, supra note 125, at 1.
129. CLOSE ET AL., supra note 127, at 2.
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to change behavior. 130 They generally feature a reentry team
comprised of a federal district court judge or magistrate judge, 131
a federal public defender, an assistant U.S. attorney, an officer
from the district’s Office of Probation and Pretrial Services, and
representatives of the treatment and service provider communities.132 Fifteen years after Judge Sifton applied Travis’s “provocative proposal” to the Article III context and created STAR in
Brooklyn, the number of federal reentry courts has grown to at
least forty-six.133
Ultimately, these two lines of innovation—ex-ante diversionary programs and ex-post recidivism reduction programs—
seek to address the same issue, but in sometimes conflicting
ways, and with very different results. This Part identified the
history and markers of both sets of interventions; Part II will
describe the tension in using one form (ex-post) to achieve the
goals of the other (ex-ante).
II. THE EX-ANTE/EX-POST PROBLEM
The federal reentry court was born of compromise. States,
ever serving as laboratories of democracy,134 sought to combat
addiction-based recidivism through programs designed to both
avoid incarceration and treat the underlying problem of substance abuse. After those programs proved successful, states expanded the model to other contexts, including reentry. When
Congress failed to provide an ex-ante diversionary program at
the federal level, judges made use of their supervised release
powers to create the federal reentry model sua sponte.

130. Laurel Beeler, Federal Reentry Courts and Other New Models of Supervision, 60 FED. LAW. 55, 56–57 (2013).
131. Magistrate judgeships are authorized under the Federal Magistrates
Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012). Magistrates are appointed by the
judges of a federal district court for renewable terms of eight years, rather than
being confirmed by the U.S. Senate for life tenure. PETER G. MCCABE, FED. BAR
ASS’N, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE SYSTEM 7 (2014). They are empowered to “hear and determine non-dispositive motions with finality,” but can
only “hear dispositive motions, . . . [and] present recommend[ed] findings and
conclusions for decision by a District Judge.” Id. at 46–47.
132. Beeler, supra note 130, at 57.
133. Villazor, supra note 85, at 255 (citing a Federal Judicial Center tabulation from March 2013).
134. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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Drug courts “emerged to address addiction and its correlation to criminal activity.” 135 Addicts often “commit crimes to finance their addiction” or “while under the influence of a substance,” making “high rates of recidivism the norm.”136 The
model pioneered in Dade County intervenes before incarceration,
avoiding both the high costs of incarceration and the collateral
consequences that follow conviction. This ex-ante approach recognizes that addiction is a disease, rather than the kind of antisocial behavior for which incarceration is the best response. 137
As the drug court model proved effective at combating this particularly pernicious form of recidivism, states continued to invest
in these kinds of programs and provided their judicial system the
authority and flexibility necessary to support their development.
The development of federal reentry programs is, in contrast,
a judge-driven process.138 Districts forming reentry courts have,
almost universally, drawn upon the experience of the programs
that came before. 139 The majority of programs focus on probationers with substance abuse issues, but there is wide variation
regarding eligibility. 140 There is also significant variation in the
risk level of participants. 141 All but two programs use the Risk
Prediction Index (RPI),142 a risk-assessment tool used in federal

135. Fisher, supra note 31, at 750.
136. Id. at 753.
137. Critics of the disease theory of addiction suggest it “has its roots in
eighteenth century liberal metaphysics, not in science.” Morris B. Hoffman, The
Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1469 (2000). However, both the
American Society of Addiction Medicine and the American Psychiatric Association now describe addiction as a brain disease. Fisher, supra note 31, at 750–
51.
138. Barbara Meierhoefer, Judge-Involved Supervision Programs in the Federal Courts: Summary of Findings from the Survey of Chief United States Probation Officers, FED. PROB., Sept. 2011, at 37 (noting that more than “threequarters of the federal judge-involved supervision programs” studied had been
developed “at the request of the court”).
139. Id. (“[T]eam members in all but two courts travelled during the planning stage to observe at least one other district’s program in action.”).
140. Id. at 38. Of the thirty-nine programs studied by Meierhoefer, thirtyfour are “open only to offenders with a particular type of problem.” Id. Of those,
twenty-three are targeted specifically to those with a “documented history of
substance abuse.” Id. Only three reentry programs targeted specific problem
populations other than substance abuse; one targeted gang members, one targeted prisoners with mental health issues, and one focused on “Native Americans who lack coping skills.” Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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probation since 1997 to “determine the general risk level of offenders received for . . . supervised release . . . .” 143 Forty-four
percent of programs targeted “high-risk” offenders, while
twenty-five percent targeted only “moderate-risk” offenders. 144
Regardless of the risk level of the population, there is one unifying trait: all participants have just been released from prison.
This is one of the fundamental challenges facing federal reentry
programs. They are essentially ex-ante interventions applied to
the ex-post context; the twin benefits of drug courts—avoiding
both the high cost of incarceration and the collateral consequences of conviction—are abrogated when incarceration is a
necessary antecedent to program participation.
That is not to say reentry courts fail to provide independent
benefits in their own right—but it is not yet definitively known
what those benefits are. Despite operating for more than a decade, no longitudinal studies of the impact of federal reentry court
participation on offender outcomes exist. 145 Where individual
federal reentry courts have undergone evaluations, they have
not been designed as long-term outcome studies. 146 That’s because “concrete data remains undeveloped because districts are
still experimenting, and no reentry courts have identical programs, focuses, or eligibility requirements.” 147 In fact, according
to a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), “no
two [federal reentry] programs are identical.” 148 The FJC found
“a wide range of goals, philosophies, and design features” in the
143. Id. at 38 n.8.
144. Id. at 38.
145. See, e.g., Beeler, supra note 130, at 58 (noting that there is “little longterm empirical research” on reentry court effectiveness); Meierhoefer, supra
note 138, at 46 (acknowledging the need to “examine the relationship between
supervision outcomes . . . and information . . . about . . . program design features”); Vance, supra note 80, at 65 (noting that there is “limited research on
whether these programs effectively reduce recidivism”).
146. See CAITLIN J. TAYLOR, PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL
REENTRY COURT IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA: REPORT ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE FIRST 164 REENTRY COURT PARTICIPANTS 14 (2014),
http://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=
soc_crj_faculty (observing the need to “consider the possibility that the Reentry
Court program may influence recidivism . . . in a time period not sufficiently
captured by this study”); see also CLOSE ET AL., supra note 127 (discussing the
District of Oregon’s reentry court and replication strategies); Patricia A. Sullivan et al., H.O.P.E. Court, Rhode Island’s Federal Reentry Court: The First Year,
21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 521 (2016) (examining some of the challenges
and lessons learned from the first year of the H.O.P.E. Court’s existence).
147. Villazor, supra note 85, at 255 (citation omitted).
148. Meierhoefer, supra note 138, at 38.
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thirty-nine reentry courts included in the study, noting that “a
better understanding of how various program features . . . relate[] to program success” would be necessary in order to evaluate their effectiveness. 149
This difficulty is, in part, a by-product of the use of state
drug courts as models. 150 They are appealing because their ability to achieve the goals 151 of federal reentry courts is extensively
studied and well-established. 152 But these federal ex-post programs are applying the model to a post-incarceration population,
without the benefit of the mountains of data produced by drug
courts over nearly three decades. 153 As another FJC study noted,
“focus[ing] on adhering to a . . . program model developed elsewhere can detract from the harder tasks of . . . identifying the
core elements of other programs that have had success addressing the same problems, and adapting these elements to meet the
new program’s purposes . . . .” 154
State courts combatted this challenge during the infancy of
drug courts. As interest began to grow, representatives from the
first twelve programs came together in 1994 to form NADCP. 155
The NADCP drafted “model state legislation and provided early
guidance to state legislatures,” to facilitate the creation of drug
courts across the nation.156 It also created a blue-ribbon commission to formulate core principles to serve as a blueprint for the
149. Id. at 46.
150. See Fisher, supra note 31, at 755.
151. See SIFTON & WEINSTEIN, supra note 125, at 3 (laying out three goals
for the STAR program: (1) rehabilitating offenders “whose criminal violations
are tied to drug addiction” and decreasing recidivism for those offenders; (2)
increasing public safety by “reducing the number of crimes committed by those
addicted”; and (3) reducing expenditures made for supervision).
152. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 31, at 754 (citation omitted) (“ The proliferation of drug courts . . . is due in large part to reduced recidivism rates and net
costs to the government . . . .”). But see Hoffman, supra note 137, at 1533 (“Drug
courts themselves have become a kind of institutional narcotic upon which the
entire criminal justice system is becoming increasingly dependent.”); see also
Belenko, supra note 43, at 33–37 (outlining six areas requiring additional study
to best evaluate drug courts).
153. See, e.g., NDCI REPORT, supra note 18.
154. BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER & PATRICIA D. BREEN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
PROCESS-DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF JUDGE-INVOLVED SUPERVISION PROGRAMS IN
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 30 (2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/
JUDGE-INVOLVED-SUPERVISION-FJC-2013.pdf.
155. About NADCP, NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, http://www.nadcp
.org/learn/about-nadcp (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
156. Id. (quoted material is accessible by selecting “NADCP Early Victories”).
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creation of additional drug courts.157 In 1997, the commission released “the defining document of the [d]rug [c]ourt model,” 158
which has served as the foundation for every adult drug court
created since its publication.159 That same year, “in response to
a great need for standardized, evidence-based training and technical assistance,” the NADCP also created the National Drug
Court Institute (NDCI), which is now recognized as the “definitive authority on the latest research, best practices, and cuttingedge innovations to treat offenders facing substance use and
mental health disorders.” 160
Given the distance between the goals of federal ex-post programs and the successes of the state ex-ante interventions, it is
necessary for the federal judiciary to (1) consider the adoption of
its own ex-ante regime; and (2) further advance its ex-post programs, as well as invest in better institutionalizing and supporting of those programs through study and best-practice development.
III. A NEW PATH FOR FEDERAL PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS
A. CREATE EX-ANTE FEDERAL PROGRAMS
The failure of Congress to create a system of diversionary
programs—that is, to learn from the states and create a federal
157. Id. (cited material is accessible by selecting “NADCP Early Victories”).
158. Id. (quoted material is accessible by selecting “NADCP Early Victories”). The document detailed ten key components: (1) drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice system case processing; (2)
using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel promote
public safety while protecting participants’ due process rights; (3) eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the drug court program;
(4) drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related
treatment and rehabilitation services; (5) abstinence is monitored by frequent
alcohol and other drug testing; (6) a coordinated strategy governs drug court
responses to participants’ compliance; (7) ongoing judicial interaction with each
drug court participant is essential; (8) monitoring and evaluation measure the
achievement of program goals and gauge effectiveness; (9) continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective drug court planning, implementation,
and operations; and (10) forging partnerships among drug courts, public agencies, and community-based organizations generates local support and enhances
drug court effectiveness. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMM., THE NAT’L ASS’N OF
DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS, at iii–
iv (1997), http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/KeyComponents.pdf.
159. See NAT’L ASS’N DRUG COURT PROF ’LS, supra note 155 (cited material
is accessible by selecting “NADCP Early Victories”).
160. About NDCI, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., http://www.ndci.org/about-ndci
(last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
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drug court—led to the creation of the federal reentry court system. Unable to follow the experience of the states and adequately
address addiction-driven recidivism in an ex-ante context, federal judges turned to an ex-post solution—a context in which
they already possessed ample authority. Congress could address
this problem by following Judge Lay’s 2004 request and pass
comprehensive legislation authorizing federal judges, the U.S.
Office of Probation and Pretrial Services, federal defenders, and
U.S. attorneys to implement federal drug courts. Unfortunately,
Congressional silence on this issue for nearly two decades signals that such action is unlikely. The 115th Congress began with
discussions of bipartisan criminal justice reform legislation to
“reduce mandatory minimum sentences, give judges more discretion to suit the punishment to the offense, invest more in alternatives such as drug and mental health treatment, and encourage programs that prepare the incarcerated for life after
prison,” but the bill died in 2016. 161 Although Senate Judiciary
Chair Chuck Grassley met with President Trump’s son-in-law
and senior adviser Jared Kushner 162 to discuss potentially reviving the bill, Attorney General Jeff Sessions was a strong opponent of the legislation when he was a senator, and the President
himself has not signaled any interest in the issue. 163
In the face of this inaction, Article III judges must take matters in hand themselves, and create a federal ex-ante regime.
They may do so under (1) statutory authority granted as part of
the pretrial services statute; (2) statutory authority granted via
the Rules Enabling Act; or (3) their inherent rulemaking powers.
Federal authorities should, at the same time, further refine expost interventions like reentry courts by (1) institutionalizing
reentry processes via the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; and (2)
investing in research programs to determine best practices and
create model ex-post programs.

161. Bill Keller, Editorial, 2017: The Year for Justice Reform?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2016, at A35.
162. Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Jared Kushner Named Senior
White House Adviser to Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/us/jared-kushner-senior-adviser-white-house-trump
.html.
163. Mary Clare Jalonick, White House Adviser Kushner, Senator Talk Criminal Justice, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/
92a2535b853d4de9a62007eb5685c13c.
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1. Statutory Authority for Article III Judges to Create Federal
Drug Courts at the District Court Level
While there has not been explicit congressional authorization of federal drug courts, Article III judges have sufficient statutory powers to create such programs. After creating the nation’s
first federal reentry program, STAR, 164 the judges of the Eastern
District of New York “concluded that if the drug court model produces benefits in the reentry context, it has the potential to produce far greater benefits if it is moved up into the presentence
phase.” 165 In 2012, judges in EDNY launched the Pretrial Opportunity Program (POP). 166 While the POP program is not explicitly a diversion program—“most participants have entered
pleas of guilty by the time they enter the program,” though “a
guilty plea is not a prerequisite to participation” 167—the “program description explicitly contemplates the possibility that the
rehabilitation of the participating defendant might be sufficiently extraordinary that outright dismissal of the charges on
the motion of the United States Attorney would be appropriate.” 168 The court has granted three such dismissals, and reduced felony charges to misdemeanors in two other cases. 169
POP cites 18 U.S.C. § 3154, the statute outlining the functions and powers relating to pretrial services, as the legal authority for such programs. 170 While this authority may seem may
seem murky, recall that the basis for federal reentry courts is
the supervised release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583. 171 Both describe
the outlines of pretrial services and supervised release regimes
in broad terms, and both commit the regimes to the broad discretion of district courts. If § 3583 can contain problem-solvingjustice multitudes, so too can § 3154.
164. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
165. EDNY ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 123, at 8.
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 10.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 63 (“Section 3154 of Title 18, United States Code, gives pretrial
services officers the authority to provide for the custody, care, counseling, treatment or other necessary social services to defendants released under pretrial
supervision. The objective of support services for defendants on pretrial release
is to ensure the safety of the community and to provide defendants with the
structure and stability necessary to reasonably assure their appearance in court
as required. Treatment and other support services provide the judge with alternatives to pre-sentence detention for those defendants who require close supervision and behavior monitoring.”).
171. Supra notes 107–27 and accompanying text.
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District courts—particularly those with long experience
with reentry courts 172—should follow the example of POP, but
take it a step further and create a true diversionary program.
Districts should look to NADCP for drug court best practices and
defining characteristics,173 and design ex-ante diversionary programs that best address the drug-crime issues facing their
courts; NDCI should be invited to study the programs from their
inception, and help to facilitate building data-driven programs
best suited for adapting the ex-ante approach to the federal context. Just as most reentry courts are currently funded via allocation of existing judicial resources, these drug courts could be set
up without additional funding; outside funding streams may also
be available, given the interest of the nonprofit sector in criminal
justice reform issues.
2. Statutory Authority for Article III Judges to Create a
Nationwide Federal Drug Court Regime
While § 3154 would appear to allow district courts to create
diversionary programs on an ad hoc basis—as was the case with
the development of reentry programs—the whole of the Article
III judiciary is also sufficiently empowered to create a nationwide federal drug court regime, via the Rules Enabling Act. 174
Passed in 1934, the Rules Enabling Act created a process for federal courts to “prescribe rules for the conduct of their business” 175 via the Judicial Conference of the United States, the policy making body of the federal court system. 176 The Judicial
172. Given the buy-in from U.S. attorneys and federal defenders necessary
to run such a diversionary program, it seems wise to look to district courts where
these relationships have already been forged via reentry courts.
173. Supra note 158 and accompanying text.
174. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012) (§ 2076 repealed 1988).
175. Id. § 2071(a). The choice of phrase “created a process,” rather than “allowed” is a deliberate one. It has long been argued that courts have inherent
power to create rules of practice and procedure for themselves. See, e.g., Charles
W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 624 (1957) (surveying and discussing
“the sources and scope of the [judicial] rule-making power ”); Roscoe Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28 (1952); Roscoe
Pound, Regulating Procedural Details by Rules of Court, 13 A.B.A. J. 12, 13
(1927) (arguing for a restoration of “the rule-making power of the courts, a
power which all common-law courts possessed and exercised when our constitutions were adopted”).
176. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (“ The Chief Justice of the United States shall
summon annually the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the
Court of International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit to a
conference at such time and place in the United States as he may designate. He
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Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, aided by five subject-matter advisory committees, 177
evaluates operation of the federal rules and considers amendments via a public process strongly resembling notice-and-comment rulemaking in the administrative law context. 178 The
Standing Committee may then recommend new or amended
rules to the Judicial Conference, who may then pass them on to
the Supreme Court.179 If the Court agrees to the proposal, it forwards them on, by May 1 of a given year, to Congress, which
then has until December 1 to override the proposal by passing a
law disapproving the proposed Rule. 180 Thus, Congress and the
President may overrule a proposed or amended rule—but only
via the normal legislative process of bicameralism and presentment. 181
The Judicial Conference should convene a select advisory
committee to study state ex-ante drug court programs, and make
recommendations for the creation of a small number of model exante programs. As was suggested above in Part III.A.1, this select committee should pay particularly close attention to the
work of the NADCP blue-ribbon commission and design programs based on their best practices, and should invite those districts with long experience in problem-solving justice to discuss
their experiences with ex-post programs to better inform the development of model federal drug court programs. These models
should then go through the rules vetting process, to ensure support from the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court. While
Congress has long slumbered on providing unambiguous authorization for federal ex-ante programs, the Rules Enabling Act proshall preside at such conference which shall be known as the Judicial Conference of the United States. Special sessions of the Conference may be called by
the Chief Justice at such times and places as he may designate.”); see also Governance and the Judicial Conference, U.S. COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/
about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
177. The five rule subject-matter areas are: appellate, bankruptcy, civil,
criminal, and evidence. How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S. COURTS,
www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how
-rulemaking-process-works (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2012) (“ The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed
under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule
shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so
transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.”).
181. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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vides an opportunity to force the issue. Congress and the President would have to explicitly reject providing federal courts the
opportunity to avail themselves of drug courts, and given the apparent inability of legislative leaders in Washington to achieve
the policy goals of the current majority, 182 such action seems unlikely.
The Rules Enabling Act requires that federal practice and
procedure rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 183 While some would argue diversionary programs like drug courts run afoul of this prohibition, similar programs at the state level have been found to be procedural rather
than substantive. New Jersey, for example, created a program
called pretrial intervention (PTI).184 The program was created
under the auspices of a state court rule, and the New Jersey Supreme Court found that “PTI [is] ‘a procedural alternative to the
traditional system of prosecuting and incarcerating criminal
suspects,’ and thus within the practice and procedure over which
our rule-making power extends.” 185 This, the court said, was because “pretrial intervention provides one means of addressing
the problems of congestion and backlog of cases which currently
confront our prosecutors, public defenders, and courts. . . . [i]t
also permits a more efficient use of the limited resources available to law enforcement authorities.” 186 The New Jersey Supreme
Court went on to find no separation of powers violation in the
creation of such a program via judicial rule, since the program
was procedural rather than substantive. 187 It cited Justice Jackson’s concurrence from the Steel Seizure case—“[w]here [sic] the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
182. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Senate Republicans Say They
Will Note Vote on Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/politics/mcconnell-obamacare-repeal-graham
-cassidy-trump.html.
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
184. The Garden State’s PTI program was created in the 1970s, as a sort of
proto-drug court. See State v. Leonardis, 363 A.2d 321, 321–32 (1976) (describing the motivation for and process of creating the PTI program in New Jersey)
[hereinafter Leonardis I]. It was one of several early diversionary programs,
experimentation with which eventually lead to the creation of problem-solving
courts. For a discussion of these early PTI-type programs, see Note, Criminal
Practice—Pretrial Intervention Programs—An Innovative Reform of the Criminal Justice System, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1203 (1975); Note, Pretrial Diversion
from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827 (1974).
185. State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607, 611 (1977) [hereinafter Leonardis II]
(quoting Leonardis I, 363 A.2d at 324–25).
186. Leonardis I, 363 A.2d at 327.
187. Leonardis II, 375 A.2d at 611–14.
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contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers
into a workable government” 188—and the Rules Enabling Act. 189
The federal process suggested by this Note would suffer even less
from separation of powers concerns, since Congress and the
President would have the opportunity to override the rule, which
was not the case with PTI. 190
3. Inherent Authority for Article III Judges to Create Federal
Drug Courts
For those seeking authority to create federal drug courts,
the authority conferred by § 3154 may appear insufficient, and
the Rules Enabling Act process may seem too lengthy and political a route to travel. In that case, Article III judges can (and
should) use their inherent powers to create ex-ante programs. As
recently as 2016, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “district
court[s] possess[] inherent powers that are ‘governed not by rule
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases.’” 191 While limited in some respects—they (1)
“must be a ‘reasonable response to the problems and needs’ confronting the court’s fair administration of justice;” 192 and (2)
“cannot be contrary to any express grant of or limitation on the
district court’s power contained in a rule or statute” 193—inherent
powers exist broadly to allow district courts to “manage their
dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” 194
Rulemaking, including the creation of procedural alternatives to trial such as drug courts, has long been viewed as part

188. Id. at 613 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
189. Id. at 613–14.
190. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that
“congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent . . . responsibility”).
191. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016) (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)).
192. Id. at 1892 (quoting Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823–24
(1996)).
193. Id. (citing Degen, 517 U.S. at 823).
194. Id. (citing four Supreme Court cases that each upheld a district court’s
use of its inherent powers).
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of courts’ inherent power. 195 The New Jersey Supreme Court
noted, in upholding PTI, that although the Garden State’s Constitution explicitly granted it rulemaking authority, 196 such
power “has also been widely recognized as falling within courts’
inherent powers.” 197 While the federal Constitution does not include such an express grant of authority in Article III, cases such
as Dietz indicate that the vesting of “the judicial [p]ower” in the
Supreme Court and “in such inferior [c]ourts as the Congress
may . . . establish” includes the inherent power to create local
rules to govern their affairs. 198 The absence of any bar, in rule or
statute, to the creation of ex-ante programs in the federal system
is sufficient to allow Article III judges to create such programs
as a means of controlling their own dockets. Whether under statutory or inherent authority, Article III judges must respond to
the ongoing substance-abuse crisis confronting the justice system by profiting from the example of successful ex-ante interventions in the states, and create a federal drug court regime.
4. Institutional Buy-In from Other Justice System Actors

Success of such judicially created ex-ante programs will require buy-in from the Justice Department and U.S. attorneys, as
well as federal defenders. While DOJ “initially argued against
adoption of federal drug courts” in 2006, it “specifically encouraged its prosecutors to actively participate in reentry courts” in
2011.199 Many U.S. attorneys have chosen to join these ex-post
programs; the 2011 FJC study found assistant U.S. attorneys
195. See, e.g., Joiner & Miller, supra note 175, at 630 (“A shorthand statement might be that the courts may provide for the ‘how’ in the courts; the legislators, the ‘what.’ Thus when the purpose of the rule is to provide for the establishment and maintenance of the machinery essential for the efficient
administration of judicial business, and it does only that, the scope of the inherent power vested in the courts is complete and supreme.”).
196. “ The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of
all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all
such courts.” N.J. CONST., art. VI, § 2, para. 3 (1947).
197. Leonardis II, 375 A.2d 607, 611 (1977) (citations omitted).
198. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. While Article III contains no analogue to the
Necessary and Proper Clause found in Article I, it is settled law of nearly two
centuries that where power is granted in the constitution, there must be a
means of carrying out that power. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 323–
24 (1819) (“Even without the aid of the general clause in the constitution, empowering congress to pass all necessary and proper laws for carrying its powers
into execution, the grant of powers itself necessarily implies the grant of all
usual and suitable means for the execution of the powers granted.”).
199. Matthew G. Rowland, Assessing the Case for Formal Recognition and
Expansion of Federal Problem-Solving Courts, FED. PROB., Dec. 2016, at 3, 7.
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were “full team partners playing [a] key role” in twenty-four of
the thirty-nine reentry programs studied.200 This partnership is
even more critical in the ex-ante context, since U.S. attorneys
must agree to forgo prosecution in the event that offenders complete the diversionary program. 201 The EDNY notes, for example, that before becoming Attorney General of the United States,
then-U.S. Attorney Loretta Lynch provided initial support for
POP.202 The transition from the Obama to Trump Administration and Attorney General Sessions’s initial tough-on-crime actions 203—particularly as they relate to drug crime 204—at least
create doubts about the future of federal participation in ex-ante
efforts. However, weighing that possibility against the long-term
benefit for federal problem-solving justice, such doubts should
not per se stall taking this critical next step. Prosecutor cooperation should be judged after the creation of the programs, for, as
was said to Ray Kinsella, “[i]f you build it, [they] will come.” 205
B. FURTHER DEVELOP EX-POST FEDERAL PROGRAMS
While this Note argues that the federal system currently
over relies on ex-post programs, it does not imply that it should
stop investing in reentry courts altogether. The courts should institute an ex-ante diversionary program while, at the same time,
further developing existing ex-post programs by: (1) instituting
them through the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) instituting a
centralized research and data collection project through USSC.
In the event political realities make that impossible, the FJC
200. Meierhoefer, supra note 138, at 43.
201. The New Jersey Supreme Court found in Leonardis I that arbitrary
prosecutorial discretion violated the rehabilitative aims of PTI, and ordered
that (1) “Defendants who have been accused of Any [sic] crime shall be eligible
for admission to” PTI; and (2) “Defendant[s] admission . . . should be measured
according to [their] amenability to correction, responsiveness to rehabilitation
and nature of the offense with which [they are] charged.” Leonardis I, 363 A.2d
321, 340 (1976) (emphasis added). Federal courts are, however, unlikely to so
circumscribe the prosecutorial discretion of U.S. attorneys.
202. EDNY ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 123, at 9.
203. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. to Re-Examine Police Accords, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2017, at A1.
204. See, e.g., Remarks by Attorney General Sessions to Law Enforcement
About the Opioid Epidemic, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-attorney-general-sessions-law-enforcement
-about-opioid-epidemic.
205. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989). The quote is often erroneously rendered as quoted above; the correct quote is “[i]f you build it, he will
come,” referring, specifically, to the spirit of Kinsella’s father.
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could play a similar institutional role—though without the statutorily prescribed role in the sentencing process.
When Jeremy Travis first proposed reentry courts, he foresaw sentencing judges playing the reentry role, and managing
the process before, during, and after incarceration. 206 To make
this possible, the USSC should promulgate sentencing guidelines specifically geared towards reentry. This would fit squarely
in its statutory mission to “[r]eflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the
criminal justice process” and to “develop means of measuring the
degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices
are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing.” 207 USSC
reentry guidelines would provide the guidance, centralization,
and incentives to create and evaluate a system that could be deployed across the whole of the federal criminal justice system.
This would also truly be a reentry court—a process geared from
the beginning towards an offender’s eventual return home, regardless of the nature of their offense—rather than the drugcourt-by-another-name-and-at-another-time that make up most
federal reentry courts today.
The FJC could also serve as the venue for such a program.
Serving as the “research and education agency of the [federal judicial system],”208 the FJC was created by Congress in 1967. 209
The FJC has already undertaken some limited studies of reentry
programs, and in each case called for further research. 210 Additionally, the FJC in 2016 released the results of an experimental
treatment of five reentry programs designed by the FJC and assigned randomly to five districts without reentry courts of their
own. 211 This report called into question the validity of the
reentry project. 212 It found that “participants in judge-led
[reentry] court programs had higher revocation and rearrest
rates than those subject to traditional supervision by probation
206. See Travis, supra note 66, at 2.
207. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(C), (b)(2) (2012).
208. About the Federal Judicial Center, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc
.gov/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
209. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (2012).
210. See MEIERHOEFER & BREEN, supra note 154, at vii–viii; Meierhoefer,
supra note 138, at 46.
211. See Letter from Hon. Ann Aiken, Dist. Court Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for
the Dist. of Or., to Hon. Jeremy Fogel, Dir., Fed. Judicial Ctr. (Oct. 27, 2016)
(on file with author) (citing FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FJC EVALUATION OF A FEDERAL
REENTRY PROGRAM MODEL (2016)).
212. Id.
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officers.” 213 The results, however, were “not deemed statistically
significant due to the number of program participants involved.” 214 The study’s design was also severely criticized by both
reentry court judges 215 and addiction research professionals. 216
Given these challenges, the FJC would need to rebuild trust with
the federal reentry community and provide support to a collaborative process, rather than undertaking a research program outside of existing reentry courts. But, its research expertise and
strong connection to the federal judiciary would make it a strong
potential institutional research and development partner. In either case, further refinement of data-driven ex-post programs
must be the next step in the development of federal reentry efforts.
CONCLUSION
Drug courts are among the few proven tools to reduce addiction-based recidivism. There is some debate on the magnitude of
their success, yet the data tell a clear story of re-arrest reduction
for both program graduates, and even those who participate
without completion. Federal reentry programs have value as
well, particularly when it comes to managing and minimizing
the impact of collateral consequences on offenders. Striking the
proper balance between an ex-ante and ex-post approach for federal courts may be difficult, but it would still be an improvement
over the current all-or-nothing approach. Such a rebalancing is
necessary for our country, through the federal courts, to take
steps toward addressing addiction as a disease, rather than as a
crime.

213. Rowland, supra note 199, at 8–9.
214. Id. at 9.
215. See, e.g., Letter from Hon. Ann Aiken to Hon. Jeremy Fogel, supra note
211 (expressing concern about project design and the absence of “a review of the
ample literature on reentry courts”).
216. See, e.g., Letter from Dr. Wilson Compton, Dep. Dir., Nat’l Inst. on Drug
Abuse, to Hon. Ann Aiken, Dist. Court Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of
Or. (Oct. 25, 2016) (on file with author) (noting “numerous methodological issues and variations in the way the program was implemented across the study
sites” which would “make it difficult to draw any real conclusions” from the
study); see also Rowland, supra note 199, at 8.

